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Non-random assignment of students to teachers can bias value added estimates of
teachers’ causal effects. Rothstein (2008) shows that typical value added models indi-
cate large counter-factual effects of 5th grade teachers on students’ 4th grade learning,
implying that assignments do not satisfy the imposed assumptions. This paper quanti-
ﬁes the resulting biases in estimates of 5th grade teachers’ causal effects from several
value added models, under varying assumptions about the assignment process. Under
selection on observables, models for gain scores without controls or with only a single
lagged score control are subject to important bias, but models with controls for the full
test score history are nearly free of bias. I consider several scenarios for selection on
unobservables, using the across-classroom variance of observed variables to calibrate
each. Results indicate that even well-controlled models may be substantially biased,
with the magnitude of the bias depending on the amount of information available for
use in classroom assignments.
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11 Introduction
Proposals to consider teacher quality in hiring, compensation, and retention require ade-
quate measures of quality. This is increasingly deﬁned in terms of educational outputs, as
reﬂected in student performance, rather than by teacher inputs like graduate degrees and
experience. In order for output-based quality measures to be of use, they must reﬂect teach-
ers’ causal effects on the student outcomes of interest, not pre-existing differences among
students for which the teacher cannot be given credit or blame.
If students were known to be randomly assigned to teachers, there would be no system-
atic differences in students’ potential outcomes across teachers, so straightforward com-
parisons of mean end-of-year achievement would provide unbiased estimates of teachers’
effects.1 But there is good reason to think that teachers are not in fact randomly assigned.
Principals may attempt to group students of similar ability together, so as to permit more
focused teaching to students’ skill levels, or they may try to spread high- and low-ability
students across classrooms. Teachers who are thought to be particularly skilled at teaching,
e.g., reading skills may be assigned students who are in need of extra reading help. Students
who are known to create trouble together may be intentionally assigned to different class-
rooms. Teachers who the principal would like to reward may be given the easiest-to-teach
students, and teachers who the principal would like to induce to ﬁnd another job may be
given the troublemakers.2 Finally, parents, perceiving teacher assignments as important de-
terminants of their children’s success, may intervene to ensure that their students are given
1There would still be the problem of accounting for sampling variation in the estimates: Because each
teacher is in contact with only a few dozen students per year, annual estimates of teacher effects are quite
noisy, and compensation schemes based on these estimates would have to be robust to the mis-identiﬁcation of
teacher quality that results from this noise. But existing strategies – e.g., the Empirical Bayes approach used
by Kane and Staiger (2008) or the similar Best Linear Unbiased Predictor used by the Tennessee Value Added
Assessment System (Sanders and Horn, 1994) – suggest methods for doing this.
2This aspect of assignments is likely to depend on the accountability metric in place: If teachers are re-
warded for their value added and if value added estimates can be biased by systematic student assignment, the
pattern of assignments is likely to change so that favored teachers beneﬁt from this bias and disfavored ones are
penalized.
2a favored teacher or kept away from a disfavored one.
The evaluation challenge in teacher effect modeling is to distinguish teachers’ causal
effects from the effects of pre-existing differences between the students in their classrooms.
If the determinants of classroom assignments are not adequately controlled, teacher effect
estimates will be biased. This bias is not averaged away even in large samples, and existing
methods for adjusting value added estimates for sampling error will not (absent strong as-
sumptions about, e.g., the across-year stability of teachers’ assignments) remove its effects
from teacher rankings.
The premise of “value added” models is that differences in the difﬁculty of the task
faced can be controlled by holding teachers responsible not for their students’ absolute end-
of-year achievement but only for the students’ gains over the course of the year. Rothstein
(2008) shows that this is false. Students are sorted across classrooms in ways that correlated
not just with their score levels but also with their annual gains. Speciﬁcally, 4th grade gains
are highly non-randomly sorted across 5th grade classrooms, with nearly as much across-
class variation as in 5th grade gains. Because annual achievement tends to revert quickly
toward a student-speciﬁc mean, a student with a 4th grade gain that exceeds the average by
one standard deviation can be expected to fall short of the average in 5th grade by about 0.4
standard deviations. Existing value added models attribute this mean reversion to the 5th
grade teacher. A teacher assigned students with high 4th grade gains in the previous year
will look like a bad teacher through no fault of her own, while a teacher whose students
posted poor gains in the previous year will be credited for their predictable reversion to
trend.
Although Rothstein (2008) documents substantial non-randomness in teacher assign-
ments that violates the restriction of common value added models (hereafter, VAMs), he
does not directly estimate the magnitude of the resulting biases, and he provides little evi-
dence about the prospects for correcting them via more sophisticated controls for students’
3past achievement trends.3
This paper attempts to quantify the bias created by non-random assignment in several
value added speciﬁcations. Three conditions govern the bias. It depends ﬁrst on the amount
of information available for use in the teacher assignment process about students’ potential
end-of-year achievement or annual gain, second on the importance attached to this informa-
tion in the formation of teacher assignments, and third on the degree to which the control
variables included in the value added speciﬁcation can proxy for those used in assignments.
I take the classroom effect – the causal effect of being in one classroom as opposed
to another in the same school – as the parameter of interest.4 This avoids the problem of
distinguishing different components of the classroom effect, the most obvious being the
effects of teacher quality and of peers. This problem is complex, and is likely made even
more difﬁcult by non-random assignments of students to classrooms. But the identiﬁcation
of classroom effects is a necessary precondition for the larger problem of isolating teachers’
causal effects, and by focusing on this smaller, ﬁrst problem I can place a lower bound on
the bias in estimates of teachers’ effects that is produced by the assignment process.
Bias in classroom effect estimates can be measured directly if and only if classroom
assignments are assumed to depend only on variables that are observed by the analyst, with
random assignment conditional on these variables. Although I present estimates of this
form, the selection-on-observables assumption is unattractive.
The bias created by selection on unobservables cannot be measured directly, but its
magnitude can be quantiﬁed under assumptions about the amount and nature of information
3Rothstein (2008) does demonstrate that unbiased estimation requires controls for dynamic student achieve-
ment: Teacher assignments are not governed solely by permanent student characteristics, but respond dynami-
cally to each year’s test scores. This rules out ﬁxed effects solutions like those used by Harris and Sass (2006);
Koedel and Betts (2007); Jacob and Lefgren (2008); Rivkin et al. (2005); and Boyd et al. (2007).
4Some value added studies use multiple cohorts of students assigned to each teacher. If assignments are
uncorrelated across cohorts – that is, if a teacher who gets high-potential-gain students this year is no more or
less likely than any other teacher to get high-potential-gain students next year – then multiple cohort studies
can convert bias in the classroom effect into mere sampling error in the teacher’s effect. But this uncorrelated
assignments assumption is a strong one, and it does not appear to hold – even approximately – in the North
Carolina data used here and in Rothstein (2008).
4available to the principal for use in classroom assignments and about the way in which that
information is used.5 The approach that I take is in the spirit of Altonji, Elder, and Taber’s
(2005) assumption that sorting on unobserved variables resembles sorting on observables,
though the speciﬁc assumptions differ: Where Altonji et al. (2005) assume that sorting
is incidental and is equally correlated with observed and unobserved determinants of the
outcome variable of interest, I assume that the sorting is intentional and that it depends on
a limited set of predictors that are observed by the school principal, a subset of which are
observed by the researcher as well. Altonji et al.’s assumption represents a limiting case for
my analysis, in which the principal can perfectly predict students’ end-of-year achievement
and gains before making teacher assignments.
Section 2 describes the data. In Section 3, I demonstrate that past test scores and behav-
ioral variables are strongly predictive of future achievement and achievement gains. Section
4 summarizes the evidence from Rothstein (2008) that teacher assignments are importantly
correlated with past scores. In Section 5, I compute and summarize the bias that arises
in several common value added models if classroom assignments are random conditional
on the observed variables. Section 6 develops the methodology for assessing the bias that
would arise if the principal had more information about students’ potential learning growth
than is available in research data sets. Section 7 presents the results of the analysis of bias
with selection on unobservables. Section 8 concludes.
2 Data
I work with longitudinal administrative data on students in public elementary schools in
North Carolina, assembled and distributed by the North Carolina Education Research Data
Center. North Carolina has been a leader in the development of linked longitudinal data on
5For simplicity, I discuss class assignments as the outcome of principals’ decisions. This is not meant to
restrict the principal to be the only determinant of these assignments; the principal’s decision might reﬂect input
from parents, teachers, and the student itself.
5student achievement, and the North Carolina data have been used for several previous value
added analyses (Clotfelter et al., 2006; Goldhaber, 2007).6
I focus on the value added of 5th grade teachers in 2000-2001. I use annual end-of-year
tests that were given in grades 3-5, as well as “pre-test” scores given at the beginning of
grade 3. I treat the pre-tests as 2nd grade tests.
The tests purport to use a so-called “developmental” scale, and the score scale is in-
tended to be meaningful (i.e. scores are cardinal and not simply ordinal measures) both
across grades and across the distribution within grades.7 I standardize scores so that the
population mean is zero and the standard deviation one in 3rd grade; by using the same
standardization in all grades I preserve the comparability of scores across grades.
The North Carolina data do not identify students’ teachers directly, but they do identify
the person who administered the end-of-grade tests. In the elementary grades, this was
usually the regular teacher. I follow Clotfelter et al. (2006) in using a linked personnel
database to identify test administrators with regular teaching assignments. I count a match
as valid if the test administrator taught a self-contained (all day, all subject) 5th grade class,
if that class was not coded as Special Education or Honors, and if at least half of the tests
that she administered were to 5th grade students. 73% of 5th grade tests were administered
by teachers who are valid by this deﬁnition.
My analysis focuses reading scores, though similar results obtain for math scores. My
sample consists of students who were in 5th grade in 2000-2001, who had a valid teacher
assignment in that year, and for whom I have complete test score data in grades 3-5. Table
1A presents summary statistics and a correlation table for reading scores on the 3rd grade
6North Carolina was one of the ﬁrst two states approved by the U.S. Department of Education to use
“growth-based” accountability models in place of the status-based metrics that are otherwise required under
No Child Left Behind.
7It is not clear that a scale with this property is even possible (Martineau, 2006), or even if it is how one
would know whether a test’s scale has the property. Nevertheless, value added modeling as typically practiced
is difﬁcult to justify if scores do not have the so-called interval property. See Ballou (2002) and Yen (1986). The
analysis here is not sensitive to violations of this property, though if it does not hold the value added estimators
considered (here, and elsewhere in the literature) are difﬁcult to justify. See Rothstein (2008).
6pretest and on the end-of-grade tests in 3rd, 4th, and 5th grades, as well as for the 5th grade
gain score (deﬁned as the difference between the 4th and 5th grade scores). Mean scores in
my complete-data sample are about 0.07 standard deviations higher than in the population
in every grade. Scores are correlated about 0.80 in adjacent grades (lower for the 3rd grade
pre-test, which is substantially shorter), with slightly reduced correlations across longer
time spans. 5th grade gains are weakly positively correlated (+0.07) with 5th grade score
levels and strongly negatively correlated (-0.52) with 4th grade scores. They are notably
negatively correlated (-0.25) with 3rd grade scores as well.
Observed scores are noisy measures of true achievement. The degree of measurement
error in test scores is usually measured by the “test-retest” reliability, the correlation be-
tween students’ scores on alternative forms of the same test administered a short interval
apart.8 A 1996 report estimates that the test-retest reliability of the North Carolina 7th grade
reading test is 0.86 (Sanford, 1996, p. 45). Unfortunately, test-retest studies have not been
conducted for other grades. Under the assumption that individual item reliability is con-
stant across grades and that item responses are independent, the 7th grade reliability can be
extended to the shorter tests in earlier grades.9 Doing so, I estimate that the grade-3 pre-test
has reliability 0.72, the grade-3 end-of-grade test has reliability 0.84, and the tests in grades
4 and 5 have reliability 0.86. I treat these as known, without sampling error.10
8Test makers often report alternative measures of reliability, e.g. internal consistency measures that are
based on correlations between a student’s scores on different subsets of questions. The internal-consistency
reliabilities for the tests in grades 3, 4, and 5, respectively, are 0.92, 0.94, and 0.93 (Sanford, 1996, p. 45).
The corresponding statistic for the grade-3 pre-test used for the cohort under consideration is not reported,
but a more recent form of the test has reliability 0.82 (as compared with 0.92 in on the corresponding tests in
grades 3-5; see Bazemore, 2004, p. 63). These statistics are computed under the assumption that responses are
independent across questions; common shocks (e.g. a cold on test day) would lead these methods to overstate
the test’s reliability.
9If item responses are not independent, reliability will be less sensitive to test length, and I will most likely
understate the reliability of the (relatively short) 3rd grade pretest.
10The sample for the test-retest study was only 70 students, in 3 classrooms. If the 70 observations are
independent, an approximate conﬁdence interval for the grade-7 test reliability is (0.78, 0.91), though within-
classroom dependence would imply a wider interval. Note also that a given test will have higher reliability in a
heterogeneous population than in a homogeneous one; the likely homogeneity of the test-retest sample suggests
that the reliability in the population of North Carolina students is probably higher than was indicated.
7A known reliability allows me to compute summary statistics for true achievement,
net of measurement error, assuming that errors are independent across grades. These are
reported in Table 1B. The correlation between a student’s true achievement in grades g and
g+1 is approximately 0.96. The 5th grade gain is negatively correlated with achievement
levels in all grades.
One can examine across-grade correlations in gain scores as well as in score levels.
The correlation between observed grade-4 and grade-5 gains is -0.42. Measurement error
in the annual test scores biases this downward, but even when corrected the correlation re-
mains negative. Thus, students with above-average gains in grade 4 will, on average, have
below-average gains the following year. To the extent that such students are systemati-
cally assigned to particular teachers, value added models that fail to account for this mean
reversion will be biased against those teachers.
3 Predictions of grade 5 achievement and gains
Table 2 presents several speciﬁcations for students’ reading scores at the end of grade 5,
using prior scores and other predetermined variables as explanatory variables. Because it
is almost certainly more difﬁcult to control for the sorting of students across schools than
within, andbecauseIfocusinthispaperinidentifyingdifferencesinteachers’effectswithin
schools, I consider only speciﬁcations for within-school variation in 5th grade scores. The
ﬁrst column shows that 13% of the variance in 5th grade scores is across schools. Column 2
adds the 4th grade reading score. This has a coefﬁcient of 0.680; neither zero (correspond-
ing to a white noise process for individual scores) nor one (corresponding to a martingale)
is within the conﬁdence interval. The inclusion of the 4th grade score increases the model’s
R-squared by 0.55; 4th grade scores explain 63.5% of the within-school variation in 5th
grade scores.
Column 3 adds to the speciﬁcation reading scores from the beginning and end of grade
83. Both are signiﬁcant predictors of 5th grade scores. Their inclusion lowers the 4th grade
score coefﬁcient by about one third, and raises the within-school R-squared by 0.045. Col-
umn 4 adds three lagged scores on the math exam. Again, all are signiﬁcant. The within-
school R-squared is 0.058 higher than in the speciﬁcation with just a single lagged reading
score. Column 5 adds 28 additional covariates, measured in grade 4, that might help to
predict students’ grade-5 achievement. These include race, gender, and free lunch sta-
tus indicators; measures of parental education; various categories of “exceptionality” and
learning disabilities; and measures of the time spent on homework and watching TV. These
are jointly highly signiﬁcant, though their inclusion raises the explained share of variance
by only 0.003.
The available variables – all or nearly all of which would be readily observable when
classroom assignments are made – explain nearly 70% of the within-school variation in
students’ grade-5 test scores. Moreover, this substantially understates the predictability of
student achievement. Recall from Section 2 that 14% of the variance in observed 5th grade
scores is noise that would not even persist into a second administration of the test a week
later. This noise is irrelevant to the predictability of achievement, and is uncorrelated with
all predictor variables. Table 2 also shows estimates of the explained share of the within-
school variance of true achievement, net of this transitory noise. These range from 0.764
with just the 4th grade score to 0.837 with the full set of controls.
Many value added models focus on the gain score rather than the end-of-year level. So
long as the grade-4 score is included as a covariate, the coefﬁcients in a prediction equation
for (observed) gains are identical to those for levels, save that the grade-4 score coefﬁcient is
reduced by 1. The bottom rows of the Table show the R-squared statistics for speciﬁcations
that take grade-5 gains as the dependent variable. These range from 0.279 to 0.398 within
schools. The ﬁrst-difference transformation reduces but does not eliminate predictability;
the principal clearly has substantial information at his disposal for the prediction of student
9gain scores.11
Also relevant to the analysis below is the value of past gains for predicting future scores
and gains. Table 3 presents speciﬁcations using grade-4 gains as explanatory variables.
These explain only 0.2% of the within-school variance in 5th grade achievement but 10.3%
of the variance in 5th grade gains.
4 Evidence for non-random assignment
The simplest value added model estimates each teacher’s effect as the average gain score
of her students. In order to attribute this average gain to the teacher, it must be the case
that the information used to make teaching assignments is uninformative about students’
potential gains, conditional on any control variables. As shown in Section 3, prior achieve-
ment and gains are strongly predictive of future scores and gains, so correlations between
teacher assignments and past gains would violate the simple VAMs identifying assumption.
Rothstein (2008) tests for “effects” of grade-g teachers on gains in grade g 1. Given the
evidence in Table 3, effects of this sort would indicate that expected grade-g gains are not
balanced across grade-g classrooms, and that the simple VAM will be biased.
Let Aig be the test score for student i in grade g. Then the student’s grade-g gain score
is DAig  Aig  Ai;g 1. The simple value added model speciﬁes gain scores as depending
only on school (-by-grade) and teacher effects and random errors:12
DAig = Sigag+Tigbg+eig; (1)
11The ﬁt statistics cannot be directly converted to those that would be seen for the true gain score, net of
measurement error, because measurement error in the grade-4 score appears on both sides of the equation for
grade-5 gains. I discuss in Section 6.4 how the coefﬁcients of speciﬁcations for true gains can be recovered
from the estimates in Table 2. True gains are quite predictable as well.
12This is essentially the speciﬁcation used by the Tennessee Value Added Analysis System (Ballou et al.,
2004; Bock and Wolfe, 1996; Sanders and Horn, 1994, 1998; Sanders and Rivers, 1996; Sanders et al., 1997).
Though TVAAS is estimated through a mixed effects framework, it implies equation (1)’s speciﬁcation for
gains, and it requires the same exclusion restriction.
10where Sig and Tig are vectors of indicators for students’ grade-g schools and teachers, re-
spectively. The teacher effects bg are normalized to have mean zero across all teachers in
each grade at each school. The estimated effect of teacher j at school s is the average gain
in classroom j less the average gain in the school:
ˆ bgj = E[DAigjTig = j; Sig = s] E[AigjSig = s]
= bgj +E[eigjTig = j; Sig = s] E[eigjSig = s]: (2)
If the mean of the error term distribution is the same for all teachers in the grade at the
school, E[eigjSig; Tig] = E[eigjSig], this is unbiased.
This identifying assumption can be evaluated by examining gains in grade g 1. The
mean gain in grade g 1 for students who will have teacher j in grade g is
E[DAi;g 1jTig = j; Sig = s] = E[Si;g 1ag 1+Ti;g 1bg 1+ei;g 1jTig = j; Sig = s]: (3)
Setting aside the ﬁrst two terms, which might be absorbed through controls for the school
attended and teacher assigned in grade g 1, the grade-g teacher’s “effect” on g 1 gains is
qj  E[ei;g 1jTig = j; Sig = s] E[ei;g 1jSig = s], the average grade-g 1 residual among
students in grade-g classroom j less the average in school s.
If this is non-zero, the grade-g effect ˆ bgj will in general be biased. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the e process is autoregressive: eig = rei;g 1+nig, where n is serially uncorrelated
and nig is independent of the grade-g teacher assignment. Then
E[eigj j(i;g) = j; s(i;g) = s] E[eigjs(i;g) = s] = rqj: (4)
Table 3 indicates that r =  0:39. Thus, any evidence that qj is also non-zero would imply
that the identifying assumption for the value added model (1) is violated.
11I present estimates of 5th grade teachers’ coefﬁcients in models for gain scores in grades
5, 4, and 3, using speciﬁcations like (1) and a balanced panel of students who attended the
same school for all three grades. These are similar to those reported in Table 3 of Rothstein
(2008), albeit estimated from a slightly different sample.
Begin with the model for grade-5 gains,
DAi5 = Si5a5+Ti5b5+ei5: (5)
The 3,013 elements of the ˆ b5 vector (normalized to mean zero at the school) can be sum-
marized by their standard deviation. This, 0.145, is shown in Column 1 of Table 4.13 I
also report an adjusted standard deviation that subtracts from the across-teacher variance
the contribution of sampling error to this variance (Aaronson et al., 2007; Rothstein, 2008).
This adjusted standard deviation, which estimates the variability of the true b coefﬁcients
net of sampling error, is 0.106: A teacher who is one standard deviation better than average
has students who gain 1/10 of a standard deviation (of achievement levels) relative to the
average over the course of the year. This resembles existing estimates (Aaronson et al.,
2007; Kane et al., forthcoming; Rivkin et al., 2005).
The remaining columns of Table 4 present counterfactual estimates that vary only the
dependent variable. Column 2 presents estimates for 4th grade gains:14
DAi4 = Si5 ˜ a4+Ti5 ˜ b4+ei4: (6)
We know that there are no causal effects of 5th grade teachers on 4th grade gains (i.e.
13Across-teacher means and standard deviations are weighted by the number of students taught, and degrees
of freedom are adjusted for the normalization of ˆ b5. Further details of the methods are available in Rothstein
(2008).
14In principle, the omission of controls for 4th grade teachers and schools creates an omitted variables bias
in (6). Rothstein (2008) presents estimates that include such controls. In practice, there is little correlation
between teacher assignments in different grades, and estimates of the coefﬁcients on T5 in equations for grade-
4 gains are nearly identical in speciﬁcations that do and do not control for T4.
12that ˜ b4 = 0), so any non-zero coefﬁcients in this speciﬁcation are indicative of student
sorting. The hypothesis that ˜ b4 = 0 is decisively rejected, and indeed there is nearly as
much variation in the elements of ˆ ˜ b4 as in those of ˆ b5: The sampling-adjusted standard
deviation of 5th grade teachers’ normalized “effects” on 4th grade gains is 0.080, nearly
as large as that for 5th grade gains. Column 3 presents an analogous model where the
dependent variable is the 3rd grade gain, the difference between the student’s score on the
end-of-grade reading test and the beginning-of-the year pretest. We see even larger apparent
effects of 5th grade teachers here.
The lower portion of Table 4 presents correlations between the estimates of the coefﬁ-
cient vectors b5, ˜ b4, and ˜ b3, ﬁrst unadjusted for sampling error and then adjusted. Adjacent
coefﬁcients are highly negatively correlated, both before and after the adjustment for sam-
pling error, while there is nearly no correlation between b5 and ˜ b3.





This indicates that 5th grade teachers who appear (by the simple model 5) to have high
valueaddedtendtobethosewhosestudentsexperiencedbelow-averagegainsingrade4. As
noted earlier, gains are negatively autocorrelated at the student level; at least a portion of the
variation in estimated 5th grade value added apparently reﬂects predictable consequences
of non-random student assignments.
The second interesting correlation is that between ˜ b4 and ˜ b3, -0.36. One hypothesis
that could explain the presence of counterfactual “effects” of 5th grade teachers on earlier
grades’ gains is that students differ systematically in their rate of gain, and that classroom
assignments depend in part on that rate. Rothstein (2008) refers to this explanation as “static
tracking”–thedeterminantsof classroomassignmentsareconstantacross grades, andcondi-
tional on these determinants the test score in grade g does not affect the teacher assignment
in g+1. In the presence of static tracking, the bias in teacher effects coming from non-
random assignment can be absorbed by pooling data on a student’s gains across several
13grades and including student ﬁxed effects in the speciﬁcation. This sort of speciﬁcation is
used by Harris and Sass (2006); Koedel and Betts (2007); Jacob and Lefgren (2008); Rivkin
et al. (2005); and Boyd et al. (2007), among others.
As Rothstein (2008) notes, static tracking implies that in simple speciﬁcations like those
inTable4thecoefﬁcientsforthegrade-gteacherongainsingradeshandk (h; k<g)should
be identical, up to sampling error. In other words, corr

˜ b4; ˜ b3

=1.15 This restriction does
not even approximately hold in the data. Classroom assignments are evidently not made
on the basis of permanent student characteristics, but respond dynamically to annual stu-
dent performance. This implies that student ﬁxed effects speciﬁcations provide inconsistent
estimates of teachers’ causal effects. The only way to control for non-random classroom
assignments while permitting consistent estimation of teachers’ effects is to measure the
determinants of assignments directly.
Many value added speciﬁcations (Gordon et al., 2006; Kane et al., forthcoming; Aaron-
son et al., 2007; Jacob and Lefgren, 2008) control for the baseline score, in effect modeling
the end-of-year score as a function of the beginning-of-year score and the teacher assign-
ment. These speciﬁcations are robust to dynamic teacher assignments of a very restricted
form: Unless teacher assignments are random conditional on the baseline score, estimates
will still be biased. The estimates in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that there is a great deal of
information available to principals about students’ potential gains above and beyond that
provided by the lagged score; there is no reason to expect that the use of this information
in forming classroom assignments can be absorbed with simple controls. I show below that
the once-lagged-score speciﬁcation is rejected by the data.
15Again, this conclusion is supportable only if the correlation between ˜ b4 and ˜ b3 is negative in speciﬁcations
that include controls for 4th and 3rd grade teachers, where those in Table 2 do not. The correlation is nearly
identical when these controls are included.
145 Selection on observables
Strategiesforisolatingcausaleffectsinthepresenceofnon-randomassignmentoftreatment
(in this case, of classroom assignments) depend importantly on whether the determinants
of treatment are observed or unobserved. In this section, I assume that 5th grade teacher
assignments are random conditional on observable variables measured in 4th grade. Un-
der this assumption, bias can be avoided by controlling for the full set of observables in
the value added model. But models that use fuller controls may be biased if the included
variables are unable to absorb all of the non-randomness of teacher assignments.
Note that no harm is done by controlling for variables that are not used in teacher
assignments; thismerelysacriﬁcessomeprecision. Accordingly, Iassumeinthissubsection
that Xi;4 is the set of variables included in Column 5 of Table 2 – the history of math and
reading test scores plus a set of demographic and behavioral variables as measured in grade
4. My baseline estimator for 5th grade teachers’ causal effects is:
DAi5 = Si5a +Ti5b +Xi;4g +eijs5: (7)
I estimate this by OLS, imposing the normalization that b have weighted mean 0 across
teachers at each school. I compare the estimates that it yields to those from four value
added models (hereafter, VAMs) with less-complete controls:
VAM1: Ai5 = Si5a+Ti5b+ei5
VAM2: DAi5 = Si5a+Ti5b+ei5
VAM3: DAi5 = Si5a+Ti5b+Ai4c+ei5
VAM4: DAi5 = Si5a+Ti5b+Ai4c1+Ai3c2+Ai2c3+ei5
VAM1 credits each teacher with the average achievement of students in her class (less the
school-level average). Few would advocate this “levels” speciﬁcation. VAM2 credits each
15teacher with her students’ average 5th grade gain score (again less the school average).
This is the basic speciﬁcation used in most value added policy and above in Section 4.
VAM3 controls for students’ 4th grade achievement. Though I have written this as a model
for the 5th grade gain, it is equivalent to a similar speciﬁcation for the 5th grade score.
VAM4 controls not just for last year’s score but for the two prior scores as well. This sort
of speciﬁcation is not widely used, but in principle it could be used in most value added
implementations.
For each model, I compute the standard deviation across teachers of b and of the bias
relative to the coefﬁcient vector from the richer speciﬁcation (7). A useful summary statistic
is the variance of the bias relative to that of teachers’ true effects,
V(b b)
V(b) . I also compute
the correlation between the bias and the true effect, corr(b b; b): It is helpful to know
whether good teachers (at least as indicated by the baseline model 7) are helped or hurt
by the assignment process. A strong positive correlation between true effects and the bias
would imply that teacher rankings are not much affected by sorting bias.
Table 5 presents the results. Each statistic is computed ﬁrst from the estimated coefﬁ-
cients (in the ﬁrst panel), then adjusted for the inﬂuence of sampling error (second panel).
The baseline speciﬁcation indicates that the standard deviation of teachers’ effects is 0.096,
or 0.124 before the adjustment for sampling error. VAM1 indicates much more variability
of teacher effects, though this is primarily bias–the bias in this speciﬁcation is more than
three times as large (in variance terms) as the true variability that we are attempting to mea-
sure. The speciﬁcation for gain scores, VAM2, eliminates much of the bias, but its variance
is still half that of the true effects. VAM3, controlling for the 4th grade score, cuts the stan-
dard deviation of the bias in half; here, the variance of the bias is 13% of that of the quality
signal. This is small in comparison with the previous models, but still substantial enough
to represent a problem for policy. In each case, biases are only weakly correlated with true
coefﬁcients.
16VAM4 eliminates nearly all of the bias relative to the richer selection-on-observables
speciﬁcation. This is unsurprising: Recall that Table 2 indicated that the control variables
includedin (7)butexcluded fromVAM4added only0.3%to theexplainedshare ofvariance
of grade-5 achievement and 0.6% to the explained share of variance of grade-5 gains. Thus,
my assumption that speciﬁcation (7) permits unbiased estimation of teachers’ causal effects
implies that omitted variables bias in VAM4 is negligible. To understand the true potential
for bias in this speciﬁcation, we will need to consider the impact of selection on information
that is unobserved in my sample but is available for use in forming classroom assignments.
I develop methods for assessing this in the next Section.
6 A model of tracking on unobservables
There is no good reason to think that classroom assignments depend only on the variables
availableinmydata. Indeed, thepresenceofnoiseintheobservedtestscorehistorystrongly
suggests otherwise. Even a principal who had no additional information would almost cer-
tainlybeabletoformalessnoisymeasureofstudents’achievementeachyearbycombining
test scores with other measures (e.g. grades) that I do not observe. In this section I develop
a framework in which classroom assignments depend on the observed variables and on
unobserved variables that have known correlations with the observables. This permits com-
putation of the variance across teachers of the bias in feasible estimates of b, though not
the bias in any individual teacher’s estimated effect.
6.1 The sorting process
Let W be the information available to the principal for prediction of student outcomes Y,
and let I = E[Y jW] be the best prediction that the principal can make given the available
information. Y might measure true gains or observed gains; we will see below that this
has important consequences for the analysis. The amount of information available to the






The principal makes classroom assignments on the basis of an index l = I +h. I
represents the portion of the determinants of classroom assignment that are predictive of
future achievement, while h represents the remaining portion. I assume that h is orthogonal
to I, to all variables in the principal’s information set, W, and (by construction) to e.16
I also assume that fI; h; eg are jointly normally distributed. The importance of predicted
outcomes in assignments is controlled by s2
h: If the principal assigns students to classrooms
solely on the basis of predicted outcomes, s2
h = 0, while perfect random assignment can be
seen as the opposite limiting case, s2
h = ¥.
Students are sorted perfectly on l into classes. That is, all of the students assigned to a
particular teacher have the same l value. This is a crude approximation at best. A typical
school has three to ﬁve classes per grade; even if these classes are perfectly stratiﬁed, l will
have considerable heterogeneity within classes. The assumption of perfect sorting is made
for reasons of mathematical tractability: With perfect sorting, we have simple expressions
for, e.g., the across-class variance of I. With less than perfect sorting, my methods will
understate the importance of I (relative to h) in classroom assignments and therefore will
understate the bias due to these assignments.17
6.2 Bias in undercontrolled value added models
The role of I in classroom assignments produces across-classroom differences in student
achievement gains that do not reﬂect teacher quality, biasing value added models with inad-
equate controls. It is easiest to characterize the bias in VAM2, which does not include any
16The assumption that h is uncorrelated with observed predictors of Y is central to my strategy: I assume
that the principal uses the observed variables solely to predictY, and does not sort students on the basis of these
variables out of proportion to their information about Y. This is required because W (and therefore I) is only
partially observable; I use the across-classroom share of variance of the observed test score history to recover
s2
h.
17The basic approach could be extended to stratiﬁcation on l across a ﬁnite number of classes (so that one
class has students with l 2 ( ¥; c1), another has l 2 (c1; c2), etc.), at the cost of considerable additional
complexity. I do not pursue this approach here.
18controls. Suppose that Y is the gain score, so that the principal makes classroom assign-
ments on the basis of his predictions of the same outcome that is used to measure teacher
effects. Then across-classroom differences in I represent biases in b. The across-classroom






In richer VAMs that include control variables, Z, these variables may absorb some of the
bias. Write the regression of I onto T and Z as I =Tk+Zp+n, where Tk is the remaining
bias. Because l is assumed to be perfectly sorted across classrooms, and because the
teacher’s identity is informative about I only through l, the teacher effects Tk solely reﬂect
differences across classes in l, and we can therefore write Tk = lx and I = lx +Zp +n.
To obtain the coefﬁcients x and p, I assume that any variables available for use in the
value added model are used by the principal to form his predictions (i.e., Z  W), and are


















































































There are thus three parameters that determine the variance of the bias in the under-
controlled model, two deriving from the sorting process and one from the choice of value
added speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst, s2
I , concerns the principal’s ability to predict students’ out-
19comes. The second, s2
h, controls the importance that the principal attaches to predicted
outcomes in classroom assignments. The last describes the relationship between the control
variables included in the value added model and the principal’s prediction, cov(Z; I). (A
fourth parameter,V (Z), is readily measured.) With knowledge of these parameters, we can






To ﬁx ideas, it is useful to consider three limiting cases. First, suppose that we control
for all of the variables used by the principal (under selection on observables). Then I = Zp
for some p, x = 0, and V (lx) = V (Tk) = 0. Second, suppose that the principal places
much more weight on variables unrelated to achievement than on predicted achievement
in forming assignments, s2
h  s2
I . Then there is little sorting on I, x  0, and V (Tk) 
0 regardless of the content of Z. Finally, suppose that the principal uses only predicted
achievement to form assignments, s2
h = 0. Then l = I, and bias depends only on the extent
to which Z can account for the principal’s predictions. If there are no Z variables, bias will
be in proportion to the principal’s ability to predict performance; with Z variables, bias will
depend on the extent to which the econometrician can predict the principal’s predictions.
6.3 The principal’s prediction
Clearly, results concerning bias depend importantly on the information available to the prin-
cipal for predictions of students’ future growth. In order to impose structure, I parametrise
the principal’s information and its relationship with observed variables. I consider several
scenarios. Intermediate cases between selection-on-observables and perfect predictability
of future outcomes are the most realistic and I focus on these, though I also include the
limiting cases for comparison. I begin with base cases in which selection is on observables,
as in Section 5:
A. I = E[Y jAg 1] = Ag 1fA: The principal has no information about future achievement
gains beyond that contained in the prior grade’s test score.
20B. I = E[Y jA] = AfB, where A = (A1; ::::; Ag 1) is the history of test scores up to grade
g 1. The principal observes the test score history, but has no additional information
about achievement gains.
Note that scenarios A & B are falsiﬁed by the evidence in Table 2: Since the principal can
observe all of the grade-4 variables that are available in my data, the fact that these variables
are useful in predicting gains indicates that the principal has more information about poten-
tial gains than just the score history. Nevertheless, these scenarios provide useful baselines.
One use to which the principal might put his information is to reduce the noise that
is contained in the test score history, A. Thus, a useful parametrisation of the princi-
pal’s information assumes that he has access to k some number of additional series, un-
observed by the researcher, that measure the true achievement history with independent,







and A = A+u, we can suppose that the principal observes in addi-
















The q series can be thought of as representing grades, student evaluations, or classroom ob-
servations that are available to the principal but not reported in typical data sets.
C. I = E[Y jA; q1; :::; qk] = AfC +q1tC1+q2tC2+:::+qktCk.
Inthelimitask!¥, thisscenarioconvergestoonewheretheprincipalobservesA without
error:
D. I = E[Y jA; Ag 1] = AcD+Ag 1fD.
Note that I retain Ag 1 as a conditioning variable; when Y is the observed gain, the lagged
observed score can provide information about the error component in Y (i.e. about DAg 
DA
g). By contrast, whenY is the true gain, fD = 0.
These scenarios are quite restrictive. As we will see, the true achievement history ex-
plains only 34% of the within-school variance of true achievement gains, and it is plausible
21that the principal, who knows something of the child’s family situation and emotional and
cognitive development patterns, has information about the remaining portion. Let W be a








. I assume without
loss of generality thatW is orthogonal to A and u.
E. I = E[Y jA; Ag 1;W] = AcE +Ag 1fE +WyE.
Results here will depend on the quantity of information that W is assumed to contain. I
index this by f = V(WyE)=V(AcE). The limiting case (as f ! V(DA
gjA)=V(AcE)18) is one in
which the principal can predict (true) gains perfectly:
F. I =Y.
This is not a particularly plausible scenario for the problem at hand, but it is useful for
illustrating the relationship between the methods used here and those used by Altonji et al.
(2005). Where in the earlier scenarios the principal observed all of the variables available to
the analyst plus a subset of the remaining component of students’ gains, here the principal
observes both components equally. As a result, both are equally sorted across classrooms.
This does not imply perfect sorting on potential gains, as the principal may consider factors
other than a student’s gain in forming classroom assignments. However, it does imply
that selection on unobservables is identical to selection on observables, as in Altonji et al.
(2005).19
The six scenarios are summarized in Table 6.
18This corresponds to f ! 1 R2
R2 , where R2 is the explained share of variance from a regression of DA onto
A. Since R2 is empirically about 0.34, this limit is just below 2.
19Altonji et al. also consider intermediate cases, where the correlation between the unobserved determinants
of selection and outcomes lies between zero (no selection) and the value corresponding to scenario F. The above
framework can be seen as providing a basis for the choice of this correlation.
226.4 Calibration
Selecting a single scenario characterizing the principal’s information, observed covariances
can be used to calibrate the model. There are three steps to the calibration: First, the
coefﬁcients entering into the principal’s prediction are estimated. This takes advantage of
the observed relationship between gains and past scores, and of the structure that the various
scenarios in Section 6.3 place on the principal’s predictions. Second, the degree of sorting
of students to classrooms is computed, using as an input the measured between-classroom
variance in observed predictor variables. Third, the bias in various value added models is
computed.
6.4.1 Estimating the prediction coefﬁcients
Table 2 presented estimates of the f coefﬁcients for scenarios A and B, when Y is the ob-
served gain score. Estimates for predictions of true gain scores, measured without error, can
be computed using omitted variables formulae. The computation for scenario A illustrates
the method. The observed gain, DAg, equals the true gain DA
g plus the difference between
the measurement errors in the grade-g and grade-g 1 scores: DAg = DA
g +ug  ug 1.
Because the test measurement error is independent across grades, ug cannot be predicted
based on lagged variables. But ug 1 can, and the prediction coefﬁcients can be obtained
by viewing the g 1 score, Ag 1, as a noisy measure of ug 1. Because the test error is






= V (ug 1), and the
bias in a regression that takes DAg as the dependent variable relative to one that uses DA
g is
simply  V(ug 1)=V(Ag 1). Thus, the Ag 1 coefﬁcient from a model for true gains equals the
Ag 1 coefﬁcient from a model for observed gains (Table 2, column 2) plus V(ug 1)=V(Ag 1).
A multivariate version of this yields coefﬁcients for scenario B when Y is the true gain.
Similar methods can be used to recover the coefﬁcients in scenarios C and D, for either
deﬁnition of Y. Begin with scenario D when Y is the true gain. We have already discussed
23a method for obtaining fB, the coefﬁcients of a regression of true gains on the observed
score history, A. A standard errors-in-variables formula relates these to the coefﬁcients for











Inversion of this formula provides an expression for cD. It is straightforward to extend this
to the case whereY is instead the observed gain.
Now consider scenario C, where the principal observes k +1 noisy measures of the
achievement history but not the history itself. If Y is the true gain, the principal’s best





of the measurement error in this average will equal 1
k+1 times the variance of the error in a
single series. Thus, when k+1 series are available the coefﬁcients for each series will be














(Note that this is identical to (10) when k = 0.) When Y is instead the observed gain, the
coefﬁcients on the observed history will deviate from those for the k other histories. The
correction for the presence of correlated measurement error in the dependent variable and
one of the independent variables is again straightforward.
Scenarios E and F differ, in that not all of the coefﬁcients can be estimated directly.
Assumptions about f, the ratio of the principal’s information about the component of gains
that is orthogonal to the achievement history to the information contained in that history,
replace estimates of the prediction coefﬁcients y. c and f are as in scenario D.
246.4.2 Recovering the sorting parameters
With estimates of coefﬁcients for predictor variables with known variance, it is trivial to
compute s2
I . The next step is to estimate the extent to which students are sorted across
classrooms on the basis of I. I assume that there is some uni-dimensional student-level
statistic w that is observable to the researcher and is contained within W (so orthogonal to
h). Empirically, I use linear combinations of past test scores for w.20 The various scenarios
pin down cov(I; w). We can recover s2
h by analyzing the between-classroom variance of
w. The within-classroom variance is






















Note that the denominator here is simply the across-class variance of w.
6.4.3 Computing the bias
I consider value added models VAM2, VAM3, and VAM4 from Section 5. These are dis-
tinguished by the control variables that are included in models for the grade-g gain. In each
case, the control variables are subsets of the A vector, so it is straightforward to compute the
covariance between these variables and the principal’s prediction. As indicated by equation
20I weight past scores based on the weights applied to either true or observed achievement in the principal’s
prediction. That is, I let w = Ag 1fA (in scenario A); w = Afj (for j = B;C); or w = Acj (for j = D;E;F).
25(9), this is sufﬁcient to compute the variance of the bias term,V (Tk).21
7 Results
7.1 The principal’s prediction
Table 2 presented prediction models for the grade-5 test score as a function of test scores
in earlier grades. As discussed above, these are readily converted into predictions of grade-
5 gains given the observed achievement history. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 present the
prediction coefﬁcients, when the predictor variables are the 4th grade reading score (column
1) or the sequence of three prior reading scores (column 2).
These models overstate the value of prior test scores for predicting true gains, net of
measurement error. This is because the noisy 4th grade test score achieves predictive power
for the observed 5th grade gain due to the presence of the same measurement error, u4,
in both variables. As discussed above, standard errors-in-variables formulae can be used
to obtain the best prediction equations for true gains. These are presented in columns 3
and 4 of Table 7.22 The within-school R2 statistics and especially the prediction coef-
ﬁcients themselves are reduced in magnitude from the speciﬁcations for observed gains.
True achievement gains are negatively correlated with past achievement levels, but not dra-
matically so.23 The model for observed gains in column 2 implicitly attaches a coefﬁcient
of around -0.81 (=  0:57 0:24) to the 4th grade gain, while the corresponding model for
true gains assigns a weight of only -0.02 (=  0:07  0:05) to this gain.
Table 8 presents estimates of the coefﬁcients that the principal would apply to the avail-
able predictor variables in scenarios C and D. Columns 1-4 show prediction coefﬁcients
21Extending the analysis to VAMs that control for non-test variables requires assumptions about the relation-
ship between these variables and the q and W variables seen by the principal. I do not pursue this here.
22In principle, the coefﬁcients of regressions that include math scores could be recovered as well.
23Note that this implies that value added models which impose a coefﬁcient of 1 on the lagged achievement
level, as in VAM2, are mis-speciﬁed.
26for observed gains, while columns 5-8 show coefﬁcients for true gains. Columns 1 and 5
repeat the coefﬁcients from scenario B, where only the observed test score history is avail-
able. Columns 2 and 6 show coefﬁcients when a second, equally noisy series is available.
Columns 3 and 7 show coefﬁcients when two series are available in addition to observed
scores (i.e. k = 2). Note that the coefﬁcients on the observed and unobserved series are
identical in columns 6 and 7, where the dependent variable is the true gain, but that they
differ in columns 2 and 3, where the observed series can be used to predict some of the mea-
surement error in the observed gain. Columns 4 and 8 show predictions assuming that the
principal is able to observe the history of true achievement. This substantially improves his
ability to predict observed gains, as the measurement error portion of the 4th grade score
can be perfectly isolated, but adds relatively little to his ability to predict true gains over
what could be done with three noisy histories.
7.2 The importance of predictions in classroom assignments
Using the coefﬁcients from Tables 2, 7, and 8 and relying on an observed component of
the principal’s predictions, I can compute the variance decomposition of the principal’s
predictions, I, into within- and between-classroom components. For scenario C, I present
estimates for k = 1 and k = 2. In scenario E, I present estimates for f = 0:25, f = 0:5, and
f = 1; the scenario of perfect information, F, corresponds to f = 1:96.
The ﬁrst column of Table 9 shows the fraction of the within-school variance in gains
that the principal is able to predict (i.e. s2
I=V(Y)) in each scenario, for true gains in the ﬁrst
panel and for observed gains in the second panel. The second column shows the across-
school share of variance for the scenarios in which I is perfectly observable. Coefﬁcients
for between-school predictions may differ from those for the within-school predictions that
I focus on, so I do not compute the across-school component of the incompletely observed






h , the weight placed on predicted outcomes relative to other fac-
tors in classroom assignments. Column 4 shows the across-classroom standard deviation in
predicted gains.
Not surprisingly, the scenarios in which the principal has more information permit him
to explain a larger share of the within-school variance in gains. Moreover, the richer predic-
tion scenarios yield larger estimates of the across-classroom share of variance of predicted
gains. Thus, the more information that we permit the principal to have about the student’s
achievement history, the larger is the bias that is implied for value added speciﬁcations (like
VAM2) that do not allow for across-classroom sorting.
Sorting appears to be substantially more important when the principal is presumed to
be using predictions of observed rather than true gains for classroom assignments. But this
can be misleading: True gains are much less variable than observed gains (with a standard
deviation less than half as large). Disparities between the panels are smaller in column 3,
showing the fraction of the variance of predicted gains that is across classrooms. Even in
this column, though, scenarios C-E show more sorting in the second panel. This is because
observed scores form a smaller share of predicted observed gains than of predicted true
gains in these scenarios (compare the R-squared statistic in column 1 of Table 8 to those
in columns 2-4, versus that in column 5 and those in 6-8), so the same sorting on observed
variables corresponds to more overall sorting in the observed gain scenarios.
7.3 Bias in value added models with controls for observables
Table 9 shows that the standard deviation of across-classroom differences in predicted gain
scores ranges from 0.037 to 0.191, depending on the assumptions made about the informa-
tion used in sorting. This variation is bias in speciﬁcations like VAM2 that do not control
for classroom assignments. By comparison, the total across classroom standard deviation
of observed gain scores is 0.134. Thus, even scenarios that restrict the principal to use little
28more than the observed variables in classroom assignments indicate biases in simple value
added models that are large relative to the effects that we hope to measure.
Table 10 presents estimates of the standard deviation of the bias in richer models that
include controls for students’ prior achievement. Columns 1-3 of this table index value
added models, corresponding to VAMs 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The bias in the simplest
model (VAM2) is substantial in every scenario. Column 2 shows that the inclusion of a
control for the prior year’s test score eliminates much of the bias in VAM2, though there
is important variation across scenarios. If we assume that the principal forms classroom
assignments on the basis of his predictions of true gains (rather than observed gains) and
that he has no information about students’ potential gains beyond that contained in their
achievement histories (as in scenarios B-D), the remaining bias in VAM3 is negligible.
However, if we allow the principal to have additional information or if we assume that he
sorts on the basis of predicted observed gains – as he likely would if accountability policies
condition rewards and punishments on observed gains rather than on unmeasurable true
gains – then the bias remains important. If the principal observes even two independent
achievement histories (e.g. the test score history plus an additional series, perhaps coming
from teacher grades) and uses them in classroom assignments, the standard deviation of the
bias in VAM3 is 0.043.
Column 3 shows that much of the bias in VAM3 remains in VAM4, which controls for
the full sequence of prior test scores. If the principal is assumed to observe the student’s true
achievement history plus another set of variables that explain an equal amount of student
gains (i.e. scenario E with f = 1), the standard deviation of the bias ranges from 0.051 to
0.076, both large relative to the standard deviation of teachers’ estimated “effects.”
298 Conclusion
Typical value added analyses treat the process by which students are assigned to teachers as
ignorable, under the implicit assumption that the statistical model used can absorb any sys-
tematic non-random assignment. This would be true if, for example, classroom assignments
were random conditional on students’ prior-grade test scores. But there is little reason to
think that this is an adequate characterization of classroom assignments. Principals have a
great deal of information beyond the prior test score that is predictive of students’ end-of-
year achievement, and this information is unlikely to be ignored in classroom assignments.
This paper attempts to quantify the bias that arises in value added models that fail to
control for the determinants of classroom assignments. The task is straightforward if class-
room assignments are assumed to be random conditional on observable variables. My anal-
ysis indicates that simple VAMs that fail to control for the dynamic process of test scores,
simply modeling differences in mean gain scores across classrooms, are substantially bi-
ased by student sorting. The bias is reduced – with a variance about 15% as large as that of
teachers’ true effects – in a VAM that controls for the lagged score, and is further reduced
when additional lagged scores are included as controls.
The analysis is more complex if we loosen the unrealistic assumption that all of the
information considered by the principal in forming teacher assignments is available in the
research dataset. I develop methods for assessing the bias when the principal is assumed
to have access to a limited amount of information that the researcher cannot observe. I
consider several scenarios for the information set, and estimate the bias in three value added
models under each scenario.
A great deal turns out to depend on how the principal uses his information: If he weights
past achievement to best predict observed gains, even a limited amount of unobserved infor-
mation generates substantial biases in the sorts of value added models that are commonly
used. Richer models that control the full test score history rather than just a single lagged
30score reduce these biases, but only if the principal has very limited information about stu-
dents’ potential. With less restrictive assumptions, biases remain quantitatively important
even in rich value added models.
Threerecentstudieshaveprovidedevidencethatappearstovalidateobservationalvalue-
added estimates. On closer examination, however, all are consistent with the presence of
substantial bias in these estimates. Jacob and Lefgren (2008) and Harris and Sass (2007)
compare value added estimates with principals’ subjective assessments of teacher quality,
which might be assumed to reﬂect unbiased estimates of teachers’ causal effects. Both pa-
pers ﬁnd that the two measures are correlated, though far from perfectly. This indicates that
there is at least some signal in the value added estimates. But the weak correlations leave
plenty of room for non-causal factors in the VAM estimates.
Kane and Staiger (2008) compare estimates of teacher effects from a randomized ex-
periment with observational estimates based on data prior to the experiment. They test the
hypothesis that the (appropriately shrunken) observational estimate is an unbiased predic-
tion of the causal estimate, and obtain estimates consistent with this hypothesis. There are
three important sources of slippage here. First, Kane and Staiger test a statistical hypothesis
about the joint distribution of the true coefﬁcients and the bias; while zero bias is consistent
with the null hypothesis, so are large biases that are negatively correlated with teachers’ true
causal effects.24 Second, Kane and Staiger’s sample provides low power. Their standard
errors are consistent with substantial attenuation of the prediction coefﬁcient due to bias in
the observational estimates. While their conﬁdence intervals might rule out my scenario
F (if biases are assumed to be uncorrelated with true quality), my more realistic scenarios
are wholly consistent with the Kane and Staiger estimates but are nevertheless extremely
troubling regarding the potential for bias in value added estimates. Finally, the Kane and
24They test the hypothesis that
cov(b;b)
V(b) =1, where b is the vector of causal effects and b is the best linear
predictor of b +k, the sum of causal effects and any bias, based on the coefﬁcients from the value added model.
This equality will hold either ifV (k) = 0 – i.e., there is no bias – or if corr(b; k) =  
p
V(k)=V(b).
31Staiger analysis is based on a carefully selected sample of pairs of teachers for which prin-
cipals consented to random assignment. One might expect that principal consent was more
likely when the two teachers would have been given similar students in any case. If so, the
results cannot be generalized beyond the sample, even to other teachers at the same schools.
The results here suggest that it is hazardous to interpret typical value added estimates
as indicative of causal effects. Although some assumptions about the assignment process
permit nearly unbiased estimation, other plausible assumptions yield large biases. Further
evidence on the process by which students are assigned to classrooms is needed before it
will be clear which types of assumptions are closest to reality. The most recent such study,
Monk (1987), is now more than twenty years old. More recent evidence, from studies more
directly targeted at the assumptions of value added modeling, is badly needed, as are richer
VAMs that can account for real world assignments. In the meantime, causal claims will be
tenuous at best.
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34Table 1A:  Summary statistics and correlations for reading test scores and gains
Grade 3 pretest Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean -0.82 0.07 0.42 1.05 0.63
SD 0.87 0.96 0.95 0.82 0.55
Correlations
Grade 3 pretest 1 0.70 0.69 0.65 -0.23
Grade 3 end-of-grade 0.70 1 0.80 0.77 -0.25
Grade 4 end-of-grade 0.69 0.80 1 0.81 -0.52
Grade 5 end-of-grade 0.65 0.77 0.81 1 0.07
Grade 5 gain -0.23 -0.25 -0.52 0.07 1
Notes: N=49,453
Score levels 5th grade 
gainGrade 3 pretest Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean -0.82 0.07 0.42 1.05 0.63
SD 0.74 0.88 0.88 0.75 0.27
Correlations
Grade 3 pretest 1 0.91 0.89 0.84 -0.56
Grade 3 end-of-grade 0.91 1 0.96 0.92 -0.57
Grade 4 end-of-grade 0.89 0.96 1 0.96 -0.59
Grade 5 end-of-grade 0.84 0.92 0.96 1 -0.33
Grade 5 gain -0.56 -0.57 -0.59 -0.33 1
Notes: N=49,453
Score levels 5th grade 
gain
Table 1B:  Summary statistics and correlations for reading achievement levels and 
growth, net of sampling errorTable 2:  Predictability of grade 5 reading scores from prior information
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Grade 4 reading score 0.680 0.430 0.356 0.347
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Grade 3 reading score 0.245 0.196 0.186
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Grade 3 pretest score, reading 0.082 0.066 0.063
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Grade 4 math score 0.120 0.109
(0.005) (0.005)
Grade 3 math score 0.045 0.041
(0.005) (0.005)
Grade 3 pretest score, math 0.020 0.017
(0.005) (0.005)
Non-test covariates nnnny
N 49,453 49,453 49,453 49,409 49,285
Goodness-of-fit measures
Models for G5 achievement
R2 0.131 0.683 0.722 0.733 0.736
R2, within school n/a 0.635 0.680 0.693 0.696
R2, within school, for true achievement n/a 0.764 0.819 0.834 0.837
Models for G5 gains
R2 0.047 0.313 0.397 0.421 0.427
R2, within school n/a 0.279 0.367 0.392 0.398
Notes:  All columns include fixed effects for 838 schools, and standard errors are clustered at the 
school level.  "Non-test covariates" in column (5) include indicators for gender, for race/ethnicity, for 
learning disabilities in reading or in any area, for Title 1 participation, for each possible 
"exceptionality" (gifted, hearing impaired, mentally handicapped, etc.), for parental years of 
education, for free and for reduced-price lunch participation, for reporting never doing any 
homework; and a linear control for the number of hours of TV watched each school day (plus a 
dummy for missing values for this variable).Table 3:  Prediction models with past gains as predictors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grade 4 reading gain 0.051 0.082 0.430 -0.394 -0.410 -0.570
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Grade 4 math gain -0.130 0.067
(0.008) (0.005)
Grade 3 reading gain 0.675 -0.325
(0.004) (0.004)
Grade 3 pretest score, reading 0.757 -0.243
(0.003) (0.003)
Goodness-of-fit measures
R2 0.132 0.140 0.722 0.221 0.225 0.397
R2, within school 0.002 0.010 0.680 0.182 0.186 0.367
Grade 5 reading score Grade 5 reading gain
Dependent variableGrade 5 Grade 4 Grade 3
(1) (2) (3)
Standard deviation of normalized teacher coefficients
Unadjusted for sampling error 0.152 0.142 0.170
Adjusted for sampling error 0.107 0.080 0.097
Correlations, unadjusted for sampling error
Grade 5 Grade 4 Grade 3
Grade 5 1 -0.39 -0.06
Grade 4 -0.39 1 -0.40
Grade 3 -0.06 -0.40 1
Correlations, adjusted for sampling error
Grade 5 Grade 4 Grade 3
Grade 5 1 -0.35 -0.08
Grade 4 -0.35 1 -0.36
Grade 3 -0.08 -0.36 1
Gain score measured in:
Table 4.  Simple models for 5th grade teachers' "effects" on gains in 
grades 3, 4, and 5
Notes:  All specifications include fixed effects for 5th grade schools and for 
5th grade teachers, normalized to mean zero at each school; only the 
dependent variable changes.  Sample excludes 111 teachers with fewer 
than 10 sample students each.  The remaining sample has 49,235 students, 
2,733 teachers, 784 schools.  Correlations are between teacher coefficients 
in the three specifications, weighted by the number of students taught and 
adjusted for the degrees of freedom absorbed by the school-level 









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel 1:  Unadjusted for sampling error
Control for all observables 0.124 0
Levels, no controls (VAM1) 0.251 0.208 279% 0.09
Gain scores, no controls (VAM2) 0.153 0.095 59% -0.05
Control for lagged score (VAM3) 0.137 0.050 16% 0.06
Control for score history (VAM4) 0.128 0.025 4% 0.06
Panel 2:  Adjusted for sampling error
Control for all observables 0.096 0.000
Levels, no controls (VAM1) 0.208 0.171 318% 0.14
Gain scores, no controls (VAM2) 0.114 0.070 53% -0.09
Control for lagged score (VAM3) 0.106 0.035 13% 0.11
Control for score history (VAM4) 0.100 0.018 3% 0.11
Notes:  Specification that controls for "all observables" includes controls for math and reading 
scores in grades 2, 3, and 4; indicators for gender, for race/ethnicity, for learning disabilities in 
reading or in any area, for Title 1 participation, for each possible "exceptionality" (gifted, hearing 
impaired, mentally handicapped, etc.), for parental years of education, for free and for reduced-
price lunch participation, and for reporting never doing any homework; and a linear control for the 
number of hours of TV watched each school day (plus a dummy for missing values for this 
variable).
Table 5.  Bias in simple value added specifications if classroom assignment is random 
conditional on observablesTable 6.  Scenarios for the principal's information about student gains
Scenario Principal's information set
Selection on observables
A Ag-1 Principal observes only the prior test score
B A={A1,…,Ag-1} Principal observes full history of test scores
C {A, q
1, …, q
k} Principal observes history of test scores plus k addl. sequences, 
each a noisy measure of true achievement in grades 1, …, g-1.
D {A
*, Ag-1} Principal observes true achievement history (without measurement 
error) plus observed prior test score
E {A
*, Ag-1, W} Principal observes true achievement history, observed prior score, 




F {Y} Principal is able to perfectly predict student outcomes
Selection on observed and some unobserved variables
Selection on unobservables is like selection on observablesTable 7:  Models for observed and true (measured without error) grade-5 reading gains 
Scenario:  A B A B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 4 reading score -0.320 -0.570 -0.150 -0.073
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Grade 3 reading score 0.245 -0.055
(0.004) (0.004)
Grade 3 pretest score, reading 0.082 -0.051
(0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.313 0.397 0.449 0.484
R2, within school 0.279 0.367 0.273 0.312
Notes:  See text for computational details.  Standard errors treat the test reliability as known 
perfectly.  In practice, this is estimated, likely with substantial sampling and non-sampling error.
Observed gains True achievement gains
Dependent variableScenario:  BCCD BCCD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Observed test score history
Grade 4 -0.57 -0.74 -0.81 -1.00 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.00
Grade 3 0.24 0.11 0.07 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.00




Second noisy achievement history
Grade 4 0.26 0.19 -0.04 -0.03
Grade 3 0.11 0.07 -0.03 -0.02
Grade 2 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.02
Third noisy achievement history
Grade 4 0.19 -0.03
Grade 3 0.07 -0.02
Grade 2 0.00 -0.02
History of true achievement
Grade 4 0.90 -0.10
Grade 3 0.00 0.00
Grade 2 -0.10 -0.10
R2 (within school) 0.37 0.44 0.46 0.54 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.35
Notes: All coefficients are for within-school predictions.  See text for details of computations.
Predictions of observed gains Predictions of true gains
Table 8.  Prediction weights if principal has more information than just the observed test 
score historyTable 9:  Variance decompositions for actual and predicted grade-5 gains
Predicted variable
Scenario
Predictor variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
True gain
A Using grade 4 score 27.3% 12.3% 7.3% 0.037
B Using 3 prior scores 31.2% 12.3% 7.5% 0.040
C Using 2 independent achievement histories 32.7% -- 7.8% 0.041
C Using 3 independent achievement histories 33.2% -- 7.9% 0.041
D Using true achievement history 34.5% -- 8.4% 0.043
E Using true history & W variable (f=0.25) 43.2% -- 10.5% 0.054
E Using true history & W variable (f=0.5) 51.8% -- 12.5% 0.065
E Using true history & W variable (f=1) 69.1% -- 16.7% 0.087
F Using perfect information (f=1.96) 102% -- 24.8% 0.129
Observed gain
A Using grade 4 score 27.9% 12.3% 7.3% 0.079
B Using 3 prior scores 36.7% 9.3% 5.9% 0.082
C Using 2 independent achievement histories 43.5% -- 9.8% 0.111
C Using 3 independent achievement histories 46.2% -- 11.2% 0.123
D Using obs. & true achievement histories 54.0% -- 14.1% 0.149
E Using true history & W variable (f=0.25) 55.9% -- 14.6% 0.155
E Using true history & W variable (f=0.5) 57.9% -- 15.1% 0.160
E Using true history & W variable (f=1) 61.7% -- 16.1% 0.171
F Using true gains (f=1.96) plus obs scores 69.1% -- 18.1% 0.191

















componentTeachers only Lagged score Score history
(VAM2) (VAM3) (VAM4)
(1) (2) (3)
Unadjusted for sampling error 0.153 0.137 0.128
Adjusted for sampling error 0.114 0.106 0.100
If classroom assignments depend on predictions of true gains
Scenario
B Using observed achievement history 0.039 0.005 0.000
C Using 2 independent achievement histories 0.041 0.007 0.002
C Using 3 independent achievement histories 0.041 0.008 0.003
D Using true achievement history 0.043 0.010 0.004
E Using true history & W variable (f=0.25) 0.054 0.021 0.016
E Using true history & W variable (f=0.5) 0.065 0.033 0.028
E Using true history & W variable (f=1) 0.087 0.056 0.051
F Using perfect information (f=1.96) 0.126 0.098 0.094
If classroom assignments depend on predictions of observed gains
Scenario
B Using observed achievement history 0.080 0.020 0.000
C Using 2 independent achievement histories 0.111 0.043 0.019
C Using 3 independent achievement histories 0.123 0.052 0.028
D Using true achievement history + obs. scores 0.149 0.078 0.053
E Using true history & W variable (f=0.25) 0.155 0.084 0.059
E Using true history & W variable (f=0.5) 0.160 0.089 0.065
E Using true history & W variable (f=1) 0.171 0.101 0.076
F Using true gains (f=1.96) plus observed scores 0.191 0.123 0.099
SD of bias
Table 10.  Bias in value added measures if information is used in teacher assignments that is 
not observed by the researcher
Value added model includes controls for:
SD of bias
SD of teachers' estimated effects